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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES COMMITTED ON THE
GREAT LAKES
With increased activity of vessels on the Great
Lakes, the extent to which federal courts may
exercise criminal jurisdiction over these vessels
and these waters becomes a necessary determi-
nation.
Federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on
the Great Lakes was recently considered in the
case of Hoopengarner v. United States.' Hoopen-
garner, while inebriated, negligently rammed his
speedboat into a cabin cruiser. The cruiser sank
and its passengers were forced into the water to
await rescue. In the attempted rescue one of the
passengers was accidentally struck and killed,
apparently by a ship attempting to rescue the
victims.
The accident occurred between a parallel set of
buoys marking the channel of the Clinton River
as it flows into Lake St. Clair. Lake St. Clair
connects Lakes Huron and Erie and is partially
within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of
Michigan and partially within that of Canada.
The accident was clearly within the sovereignty
of Michigan.2
Although his craft was not the one which
actually hit and killed the decedent, Hoopen-
garner was indicted by the State of. Michigan for
involuntary manslaughter. The trial resulted in a
conviction of simple assault.3 Based on the same
3270 F. 2d 465 (6th Cir. 1959).
2 The channel is within Michigan's boundary.
'Hoopengamer v. United States, supra note 1, at
468.
facts and subsequent to the Michigan trial,
Hoopengarner was indicted and convicted of
involuntary manslaughter in a federal district
court sitting in Michigan. 4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
decision. 5
The basis of federal criminal jurisdiction over
maritime offenses6 is Congressional enactment. 7
Federal courts have criminal jurisdiction when the
vessel upon which, the crime is committed or the
4 Federal prosecution on the same facts in a federal
court after a state trial does not constitute doublejeopardy under the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution. United States v. Bartkus, 359
U.S. 121 (1959). The district court appears not to have
handed down a written decision. Letter received from
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
Cincinnati, Ohio.
Hoopengamer v. United States, supra note 1.
'Federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction stems
from article III, section 2 of the United States Consti-
tution, which provides, "The judicial power shall ex-
tend..., to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction. .. ." Standing alone, this provision does not
give federal courts jurisdiction over maritime crimes.
If the federal court sat as an admiralty court, the trier
of fact would be the judge. Juries are unknown in ad-
miralty cases. 2 C.J.S. Admiralty §5 (1936). The federal
constitution, however, guarantees a defendant the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases. "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall -enjoy the right to
a... trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. CONST.
amend VI. To enable federal courts to hear criminal
cases and to guarantee the accused's right to a jury
trial, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §7 (1959).
7 18 U.S.C. §7 (1959). Congress' authority to act is
based on article I, section 8 of the Constitution: "The
Congress shall have power.., to define and punish
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas ... 2
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waterway upon which it is traveling, is within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.8
The waterways and vessels included in the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction are set
out in 18 U.S.C. §7:
"The term 'special maritime and territorial




any other waters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States and
outside the jurisdiction of any particular State,
and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to
the United States or any citizen thereof, or to
any corporation created by or under the laws of
the United States, or of any State, Territory,
District, or possession thereof, when such vessel
is within the admiralty and maritime juris-
diction of the United States and out of the
jurisdiction of any particular state.
(2)
Any vessel registered, licensed or enrolled under
the laws of the United States, and being on a
voyage upon the waters of any of the Great
Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or
upon the Saint Lawrence River where the same
constitutes the International Boundary Line."9
This statute only confers jurisdiction; the
accused will then be tried under the appropriate
section of the federal criminal code."0
Under §7 federal courts can base their juris-
diction over crimes committed on the Great Lakes
on the status of the defendant's vessel, i.e., whether
it is registered, licensed, or enrolled under the
laws of the United States, 1 or owned by a corpo-
8 18 U.S.C. §7 (1959).
9 Prior to 18 U.S.C. §7 (1959), the federal district
courts were permitted to punish certain enumerated
crimes when these crimes were committed at certain
places. The law of today is merely a refined codification
thereof. An example is Rv. STAT. §5346 which stated,
"Every person, who, upon the high seas or any arm
[thereof] within the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States and out of the jurisdiction of ariy particu-
lar state on board any vessel belonging ... to the
United States or any citizen thereof..., commits an
assault shall be punished ...."
10 For the federal criminal code see 18 U.S.C. §§1-403
(1959).
11 Registration or enrollment of a vessel under federal
law endows the vessel with national character, entitling
ration or a United States citizen, or on the location
of the vessel at the time of the commission of the
crime, i.e., whether it ig on the high seas, the
Great Lakes, and any other waters outside the
jurisdiction of a state but within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.is
its owner to the protection of federal law and courts.
The Mohawk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 566 (1865). Generally,
registration is not compulsory; it is a privilege or an
advantage. Gaston v. Warner, 272 Fed. 56, 60 (1921),
affd, 260 U.S. 201 (1922). When the vessel is employed
in the transporting of people or merchandise for hire on
navigable waters, it appears that the vessel must be
enrolled or licensed. The Supreme Court has said that
every vessiel of the United States is bound to have a
register or an enrollment from her home port, and
without the right one with reference to the trade in
which she is engaged, a vessel is entitled to no protec-
tion under United States law and is liable for seizure for
violation of such law. Badger v. Guitierez, 111 U.S. 734
(1883). See also Braga v. Braga, 314 Mass. 666, 51 N.E.
2d 429 (1943). Registration publishes the nationality of
a vessel engaged in trade with foreign nations. 60 Stat.
1097 (1946), 46 U.S.C. §11 (1959) designates the
vessels which are entitled to register under the laws of
the United States. They are generally vessels built or
rebuilt within the United States and belonging to citi-
zens thereof or vessels which are subject to federal law.
Enrollment, on the other hand, declares the nationality
of a vessel engaged in domestic commerce along the
navigable waters of tle United States. To be enrolled a
vessel must possess the same qualifications and comply
with the same requirements necessary for registering,
46 U.S.C. §§251-260 (1950), the only difference be-
tween the two being the waterways which the vessel
travels and the ports which it visits. Enrollment en-
ables the vessel to procure a coasting license authorizing
trading along the coast. Together, the enrollment and
the license entitle the owner to the protection of the
laws of the United States. Despite the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, the federally enrolled vessel remains
subject to the jurisdiction of state courts and is not
immune from the operation of valid state laws. In
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855),
Maryland enacted a statute making it unlawful to
catch oysters in a scoop; the penalty was forfeiture of
the ship. Plaintiff violated this statute and in a suit for
return of the vessel claimed that he was not subject to
the laws of Maryland since his vessel was enrolled
under the laws of the United States. Held: the plaintiff
was subject to a valid state law even if the vessel was
licensed and enrolled. Where the state law is invalid,
the state does not have any rights over the party.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In
Veazie v. Moor 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1852), the
waterway, a river, was -entirely within the state of
Maine, having no outlet and only partially navigable.
The state had granted exclusive navigation rights to a
company. The Court held that another company's
vessel was not entitled to navigate the waters even
though it held a federal license to carry on a coasting
trade, as ihe exclusive franchising was an internal
matter for the state. Thus, the advantage of enrollment
is not that the vessel is no longer under the control of a
particular state, but rather, that the vessel is now
under the jurisdiction of the federal government as
well as the states.




The federal district court in the Hoopengarner
case based its jurisdiction on both the status of the
defendant's vessel, registered under United States'
law and traveling upon a waterway connecting
the Great Lakes, and the location of the vessels,
held to have been on the high seas.
In basing its jurisdiction on the status of the
vessel, the district court was in accord with prior
decisions of the federal courts. When a vessel ipon
which a crime is committed is registered or enrolled
under United States' law, federal criminal juris-
diction is dear. "A vessel registered as a vessel of
the United States... is considered as a portion of
its territory and persons on board are protected and
governed by the laws of the country to which the
vessel belongs."' 3 The significance of basing federal
criminal jurisdiction on the status of the vessel is
that ihe federal courts have jurisdiction regardless
of where the crime is committed on the Gxeat
Lakes,14 as for example, in Hoopengarner where
the collision of the vessels and the passenger's
death occurred wholly within the sovereignty of
Michigan.
In also basing its jurisdiction on the location of
the vessel, the court held that it had jurisdiction
over an offense committed on a vessel- if at the
time the crime was committed, the vessel was on
the high seas." Historically, the federal courts had
not considered the Great Lakes as part of the high
seas3 6 In United States v. Rodgers, the United
13 St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134 (1894).
The defendant committed murder while on an American
owned vessel on the high seas, within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out-
side the jurisdiction of any state. The defendant claimed
that the indictment did not sufficiently show the part
of the high seas so as to give the federal courts jurisdic-
tion. The Court, however, said that the objective in
producing the registry of a ship was "to meet any ques-
tion that might arise as to the jurisdiction of a court of
the United States, to punish the particular offense
charged." 154 U.S. 134, 152 (1894).
14 This was substantiated in United States v. Gill
204 F. 2d 740 (7th Cir. 1953), where the defendant was
indicted and convicted for an assault committed on a
vessel registered under the laws of the United States
while the vessel was traveling on Lake Michigan. The
assault conclusively occurred within Indiana's juris-
diction. Nevertheless, the .Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that the federal court had jurisdic-
tion over the crime, in that the vessel's registration
brought the case under 18 U.S.C. §7(2) (1959).
1 The term high seas has been defined as a large
body of water other than a river, which is open and
unconfined and not under the exdlusive control of one
nation. REsTATELIENT, CoNF.icTs OF LAWS §406(a)(1934).1 .Ex parle Byers, 32 Fed. 404 (E. D. Mich. 1887).
The defendant was indicted for a crime committed on
an American vessel which was traveling on the Ca-
States Supreme Court altered this position and
held the Great Lakes to be a part of the high seas
under a statute which was the predecessor of the
present act.17 Mr. Justice Field, speaking for the
majority, stated that in determining whether a
body of water is part of the high seas, the criterion
should be the practical navigability of the water-
way for commercial purposes, and not the water's
tides or its saline qualities. The Great Lakes are
as commercially navigable as the oceans; thus,
they should be considered high seas.
The district court in Hoopengarner held that
the channel in which the decedent was killed was
part of Lake St. Clair and, held that Lake St.
Clair, although merely a connecting waterway and
not one of the Great Lakes, still fell within the
federal courts' criminal jurisdiction because its
commercial navagibiity made it a part of the
high seas."'
Although the district court held the Great Lakes
and the waters connecting them to be a part of the
high seas, it is arguable that neither the Great
Lakes nor the waters connecting the Lakes are
part of the high seas. The statute, 18"U.S.C. §7(2),
states, "The special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States shall include...
any vessel, registered, licensed, or enrolled under
the laws of the United States, and being on a
voyage upon the waters of the Great Lakes or
upon any of the waters connecting them...."
It can be argued that Congress, by its enactment
of §7(2), did not consider either the Great Lakes
or the waters connecting them to be part of the
nadian side of the Detroit River. The court held that
the federal courts had no jurisdiction in such waters
because the Great Lakes were not considered part of
the high seas. If the Great Lakes had been the high
seas, the fact that the crime occurred in Canada would
have had no effect on the jurisdictional question. See
also Miller's Case, 17 Fed. Cases 300 (No. 9558) (6th
Cir. 1867). The state view was to the same effect as the
,federal.,Tyler v. Michigan, 8 Mich. 319 (1860).
17 150 U.S. 249 (1893). On certificate of division in
opinion from the district court, the decision was seven
to two with Justices Gray and Brown dissenting.
Rodgers was convicted in federal district court of hav-
ing assaulted a fellow seaman while on a vessel traveling
on the Canadian side of the Detroit River, a river con-
necting Lakes Huron and Erie. The court construed§5346, 35 Stat. 1142 (1909), which contained what is
now 18 U.S.C. §7(l) (1959). The court did not decide
the case on the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. §7(2) notwith-
standing the fact that the sub-section was enacted
before the trial and the vessel was registered. The
possible reason is that the cause of action arose before
the enactment of §7(2).
IsBrief for Appellant, p. 31a, Hoopengarner v.
United, States, supra note 1.
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high seas. The content of §7(2) does not add
anything to -the existing law promulgated by
§7(1) unless the Lakes and their connecting water-
ways are not part of the high seas. Thus, the court
in Hoopengarner was in error in basing its juris-
diction on the fact that the offense occurred on
the high seas of the waters connecting the Great
Lakes.
This same criticism applies to the majority of
the Supreme Court in their decision in the Rodgers
case. The Court construed the term "high seas"
exactly contrary to that of Congress; they held
that the Great Lakes were to be considered part
of the high seas. The majority however, might be
justified .by the hiatus that would have resulted if
the court had not taken jurisdiction. Since the
offense occurred in Canada, no state court had
jurisdiction, thus, the accused would not have been
tried by any American court if the federal court
lacked jurisdiction. This rationale does not apply,
however, to the facts in the Hoopengarner case.
The death occurred while the vessels were on a
waterway within the jurisdiction of Michigan.'9
The federal court did not have to take jurisdiction
in order for the accused to be tried for his crime;
Michigan had already prosecuted him.
If the vessel is not on the high seas, the federal
courts may still have criminal jurisdiction, for
Congress has provided that the federal courts
shall have jurisdiction when the vessel is on "any
other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts ... [and] outside
the jurisdiction of a particular state."0
Note the difference when the court bases its
criminal jurisdiction on the vessel being located
19 The court in Ex parte O'Hare, 179 Fed. 662 (2d
Cir. 1910), stated that the fact that the assault in the
Rodgers case occurred in Canada was significant. The
court said at 666 that the implication in Rodgers is that
"if the vessel on which the assault was committed had
been so close to the Michigan shore as to be within thejurisdiction of that state, a different conclusion would
have been reached." The implication to which the
court was referring was the following statement by Mr.
Justice Fields in the Rodgers case: "From the boundary
line, near the center to the Canadian shore, it is out of
the jurisdiction of the State of Michigan. The case
presented is therefore directly within the provision."
150 U.S. 249 (1893). The court in the O'Hare case was
reading a negative implication into Mr. justice Fields'
statement in the sense that he said the case in Rodgers
is directly within the equivalent of the second clause of
§7(1) ("any other waters") in that it occurred outside
the jurisdiction of Michigan. Thus, if the accident had
occurred within Michigan, the statute would not have
applied, and the federal court would have lacked
criminal jurisdiction.
20 18 U.S.C. §7(1) (2d cl.) (1959).
under the "any other waters" provision of §7(1)
rather than the "high seas" provision of §7(1).
The federal court has jurisdiction under the "any
other waters" provision only when no state court
has jurisdiction. This is not true when the court
bases its jurisdiction of the "high seas" provision
of §7(1).
In United States v. Bevams the United States
Supreme Court said that "it is clear that Congress
under the law has not given federal courts juris-
diction over any offenses committed on a river...
out of the jurisdiction of any state." 22
The significance of the distinction was also made
by the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in
Murray v. Hildreth,2s where the court said that the
phrase, "river, haven, bay or basin" as used in
older statutes has merely been rephrased by the
clause "any other waters" used in the present
statute. The court continued, "It [the phrase 'any
other waters'] purports to do nothing more than
to use general terms of description in place of the
attempted enumeration... of all waters within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States." 24
In the Hildreth case, the defendant committed
murder while the vessel was on the Atlantic Ocean
within two hundred feet of the Florida coast. The
federal court, holding that it had jurisdiction,
said, "From the beginning Congress has asserted
jurisdiction of offenses committed on the high
seas. . .. It was only when Congress came to legis-
late as to waters other than the high seas, such as
rivers, havens, and bays, that it took jurisdiction
of such waters only as were not within the juris-
diction of any particular state." 25
Thus, when the crime is committed on a vessel
traveling on a waterway within the jurisdiction of a
particular state, the issue is whether the waterway
is part of the "high seas" under the first clause of
§7(1), or part of "any other waters" under the
second clause of §7(1).
Courts have given some indication as to what
waterways are considered waters other than the
high seas within the admiralty and maritime
"16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818). The offense was
committed on a United States naval vessel, laying in
the channel of Boston Harbor, completely within thejurisdiction of Massachusetts. The federal court hadjurisdiction, however, because of the military status of
the vessel notwithstanding the fact that the offense
occurred within the jurisdiction of a state.
22Id. at 386.
61 F. 2d 483 (5th Cir. 1932).
24Id. at 485.
2Id. at 485.
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